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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 29/01/2008

Accident number: 536

Accident time: Not recorded

Accident Date: 08/07/2004

Where it occurred: MF LK-257,
Katkovalam, Point
Pedro Municipality,
Jaffna District

Country: Sri Lanka

Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 28/07/2004

ID original source: None

Name of source: [Name removed]

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: P2Mk2 P4Mk1 AP
blast

Ground condition: rocks/stones
Date last modified: 29/01/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: SL Grid

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east: Easting/Long.: 142219
Map scale: Point Pedro,
Katkovalam

Map north: Northing/Lat.: 510079
Map series: GIS Arc Explorer 2.0

Map edition: 27.05.2004

Map sheet: Jaffna.AEP

Map name: 1: 20000

Accident Notes
inadequate medical provision (?)
inadequate training (?)
long handtool may have reduced injury (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
non injurious accident (?)
standing to excavate (?)
use of rake (?)
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Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as an IMSMA file. Its
conversion to a document had led to the formatting being lost. The substance of the report is
reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text in [ ] is
editorial.

IMSMA accident report
Date of report: 08.07.2004
Date of report received: 28.07.2004
Nearest town: MF LK-257, Katkovalam, Point Pedro Municipality, Jaffna District
Coord system: SL Grid; Easting/ Long.: 142219; Northing/ Lat.: 510079; GPS
Map name:

Point Pedro, Katkovalam

Map series:

GIS Arc Explorer 2.0

Map sheet:

Jaffna.AEP

Map edition: 27.05.2004
Map scale:

1: 20000

Mine accident coordinates description:
- Antipersonnel Mine model P4 mark 1 exploded during mine-clearance in minefield LK-257,
Katkovalam. Explosion took place 1,5 meters in front of [Demining group] deminer while he
was raking the uncleared lane with heavy rake.
- Deminer tried to move a 5-10 kg rock with a heavy rake towards himself to pick it up. Stone
was only partly visible, covered by sand and little rocks. When pulling, it started to move, and
deminer dragged it slowly towards himself.
- Explosion occurred and broke the stone, throwing pieces everywhere also hitting the
deminer.
- Antipersonnel mine was most likely between the stone and the working deminer in a 1,5
meter distance.
- Deminer fell backwards to his bottom and lost his hearing and vision for few minutes. His
visor (head protection) was hit by little stones and fell off. Fragmentation vest (body
protection) took some punches too. After 15 minutes he recovered to mentally and physically
normal state. He did not have any wounds, bruises nor pain anywhere in medic’s full body
inspection. Nevertheless, he was evacuated against his will.
- There were not other personnel within safety distance which is 10 meters in minefield LK257.
- Place of incident is situated in the middle of the minefield LK 257 where soil contains a lot of
rocks.
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Internal demining group Lessons Learned document,
•

The team leader didn’t close the lane where the incident occurred, and the work in
the lane continued after a couple of hours.

•

There were no injury report filled by the local doctor in the area, the deminer was only
examined by one of the team paramedics.

•

The assistants in HQ misunderstood information from the area. Thereby the incident
changed from a deminer setting off a mine, into a deminer who had found the crater
of a detonated mine in his lane.

•

The assistants in HQ didn’t have enough insight into the demining process, and
thereby they couldn’t question the information from the team leader.

•

The senior staffs in HQ have to investigate all not normal information from the
operation areas, and inform the operation manager about it.

•

At the time of the incident there were no technical advisor in the operation area, and it
is believed that that is the main reason to all the mistakes.

Action taken within [Demining group]:
•

Retraining of all our team leaders in their responsibilities concerning
accidents/incidents have been carried out, and they have all been informed about the
mistakes in this incident.

•

Retraining of all our paramedics and their responsibilities has been carried out.

•

HQ will in the future repeat the signals from the operation areas, and the team leader
will confirm the reply from HQ.

•

In the future the operations manager will personally confirm any not normal signals
from the operation areas, to avoid the same mistakes in the future.

Victim Report
Victim number: 708

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not taken to hospital

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
minor Hearing
COMMENT: No Medical report was made. This was considered a non-injurious accident.
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the deminer
should have raked the area leading up to the rock before trying to move it. It seems that he
did not know that he should do this.
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the postaccident field and medical events were entirely mismanaged. The internal investigators stated
that this was probably because there was no ex-patriot present. If the training of National staff
was not good enough for them to operate within the approved SOPs without an ex-patriot
present, the work should have been suspended while suitable candidates were trained. Other
demining groups in Sri Lanka have no trouble finding well-educated and responsible field
supervisors who can be readily trained.
The demining group had put in place the use of a long tool (rake) that kept the Victim far
enough away from a blast to avoid injury, and his PPE was effective at protecting him from
any risk remaining at that distance. Had he been using conventional short hand-tools, some
injury would have been expected.
Stand-off (distance from the detonation) is the most effective PPE and the Rake Excavation
system makes use of this. It is possible that the extreme length of the tool makes initiation of
small AP blast mines with the Heavy rake more likely, but any increased risk of initiation is
offset by the reduced chance of that initiation resulting in injury. The accident is a good
example of balancing an effective demining process and PPE to result in a very low risk of
injury.
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